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Nigeria is a multi-religious and multi-ethnic country with over 250 ethnic groups.
1 The people 
of the various kingdoms and empires in the territories now known as Nigeria, first came 
into contact with Europeans from about 1450 through the trade in slaves. British colonial rule in 
Nigeria commenced with the annexation of Lagos as a Crown Colony in 1861.2 Nigeria as we 
now know it, was created in 1914 with the amalgamation of Northern and Southern Protectorates 
of Nigeria. These Protectorates had been separately subjected to colonial rule until that point. 
Nigeria achieved independence from British colonial rule on 1 October 1960. It became a republic 
in 1963, which meant the Queen was no longer head of state. Over the course of time, the country 
has been transformed into a federation with a central government and thirty-six sub-national units 
(states).3
This report provides an overview of the legacies 
of colonisation and demonstrates its impact 
on transitional justice in Nigeria. It argues that 
the current injustices in Nigeria are strongly 
connected to the country’s colonial history. 
Colonial policies, laws and structures have 
continued in use, either directly or indirectly and 
to various extents, long after independence. 
These ‘legacies’ play a fundamental role 
in the limited success of transitional justice 
movements in Nigeria. The first part sets out 
the colonial experience in the country. The second part examines the post-colonial era and the 
authoritarian rule that followed closely on the heels of colonial rule. There is an examination of 
the political transition to democratic governance and the need, at that point, for transitional justice 
mechanisms and processes to address gross violations of human rights. The third part examines 
the engagement with transitional justice mechanisms and processes deriving from the dynamics 
of the two previous periods.
1.  Chinonye Obiagwu and Chidi Anselm Odinkalu ‘Nigeria: Combating Legacies of Colonialism and Militarism’ in Abdullah A. An-Na’im 
Human Rights under African Constitutions: Realizing the Promise for Ourselves (University of Pennsylvania Press 2003) 211 at 212.
2.  A narrative of how the cession came about is provided in Attorney General of Southern Nigeria v John Holt and Company (Liverpool) 
Limited and Others [1915] A.C 1, 4-7.
3. At independence, there were four strong regional governments which were progressively broken down for the current 36- state structure.
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Law and Justice Framework
The use of the ‘peace and good government’ (POGG) power was an important feature of 
British imperial rule all over the world. In the famous colonial law case, Ibralebbe v The Queen,4 
Viscount Radcliffe, stated that “The words ‘peace, order and good government’ connote, in British 
institutional language, the widest law-making powers appropriate to a Sovereign.”5 POGG is a term 
of art: whoever was conferred with the power – whether a colonial governor or a legislative body – 
could not be questioned.6 POGG has been used for furthering the cause of British imperialism (to 
facilitate direct or indirect control and governance of its overseas possessions). It has also been 
used for granting powers of self-rule (and later independence) at some point, to various parts of 
the British Empire.
POGG served as a linchpin for legalising British colonial rule in Nigeria too. It was introduced 
into Nigerian law in 1872, through an Order in Council, which was granted power to the British 
Consul over British subjects in the Niger Delta 
territories7 as well as other parts of the country. 
For instance, Section 6 of the Northern Nigeria 
Order in Council of 1899 provided that the 
High Commissioner may, in the exercise of 
the powers and authorities conferred upon him 
through Proclamation:
“…provide for the administration of justice, the raising of revenue, and generally 
for the peace, order, and good government of Northern Nigeria, and of all persons 
therein, including the prohibition and punishment of acts tending to disturb the 
public peace.”
Following the amalgamation of the Northern and Southern Protectorates in 1914, the country was 
governed as a unitary state.8 However, the McPherson Constitution of 1951 introduced a modified 
federal system for the administration of the country.9 Nigeria became a full-fledged federation 
under the 1954 Lyttleton Constitution.10
Each of the country’s colonial constitutions, from 1914, to the Independence Constitution of 1960, 
provided for ‘peace, order and good government’ of the country. Similar provision for ‘peace, 
order and good government’ is contained in the post-colonial constitutions, from 1960, to the 
current 1999 Constitution. However, the Independence Constitution and the 1963 Republican 
Constitution further linked the ‘peace, order and good government’ clause to the declaration of 
a state of emergency, by the federal (central) government. Sections 65 (1) and 70 (1) of the 
Independence and Republican Constitutions respectively provided that Parliament is empowered 
II THE COLONIAL LEGACY
4. 1964] A.C. 900 P.C.
5. Ibid. at 923.
6.  See Hakeem O. Yusuf Colonial and Post-Colonial Constitutionalism in the Commonwealth: Peace, Order and Good Government 
(Routledge Abingdon 2016).
7. See Benjamin Obi Nwabueze A Constitutional History of Nigeria (C. Hurst and Co. London 1982) 6.
8. Isawa Elaigwu ‘Federalism in Nigeria’s New Democratic Polity’ (2002) 32 (2) Publius 73, 74.
9.  Ignatius Akaayar Ayua and Dakas J. Dakas ‘Federal Republic of Nigeria’ in John Kincaid and G. Allan Tarr Constitutional Origins, 
Structure and Change in Federal Countries (McGill University Press Montreal & Kingston 2005).
10.  A. Inegbedion and E. Omoregie ‘Federalism in Nigeria: A Re-Appraisal’ (2006) 4 (1) Journal of Commonwealth Law and Legal Education 
69, 71; Ignatius Akaayar Ayua and Dakas J. Dakas ‘Federal Republic of Nigeria’ in John Kincaid and G. Allan Tarr Constitutional Origins, 
Structure and Change in Federal Countries (McGill University Press Montreal & Kingston 2005) 242
“The words ‘peace, order and 
good government’ connote, in 
British institutional language, 
the widest law-making powers 
appropriate to a Sovereign.”
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to make laws for the country or any part of it which is not covered by the legislative lists11 but which 
Parliament considers “necessary or expedient for the purpose of maintaining or securing peace, 
order and good government during any period of emergency.”
Law Enforcement and Security
The British established decentralised military and police forces in the various territories that 
became Nigeria at the inception of colonial rule. This was with a view to expand its control over 
the territories.12 The first of such forces was the Consular Guard established in Lagos, South West 
Nigeria in 1861. This was an armed force with the mandate to protect the colonial government’s 
interest. The British had established a police force drawn from the northern part of the country to 
protect its rule in the South West, which was made up of the Yoruba ethnic group. This police force 
was consequently also known as the ‘Hausa Force’.13 Thus, the British set out to promote discord 
among ethnic groups in the country. In that way, the Nigerian Police, right from its inception,14 
suffered from a cultural dislocation.
Colonialism played a critical role in police culture in Nigeria.15 Police forces were employed as 
agents of repression and violence following piecemeal conquests of indigenous populations.16 
The duty of the police was to enforce law and order, subdue and subjugate the local communities 
and foster the interests of the British Empire. Thus, the Police, accountable only to the colonialists, 
engaged in excessive killing, maiming and looting. This approach to policing remains a prominent 
feature of not just policing, but also virtually all of military and security agencies and forces in the 
country to date. It is pertinent in this regard, to note that the military and other security forces in 
the country grew out of the initial colonial forces.
Colonial  Polit ical  Economy
On the political front, British colonial rule in what is now Nigeria, essentially began from coastal 
areas with the establishment of ‘Crown’ colonies. What came to be referred to as ‘direct rule’ was 
established in these Crown colonies. ‘Direct rule’ was a system which involved the use of British 
institutions implementing British ideas of government. However, British Colonial rule in many 
territories that became Nigeria, was conducted through a system of ‘indirect rule.’ ‘Indirect rule’ 
involved governing the local population through indigenous political institutions. As the opposite 
of ‘direct rule’, it referred to rule through the deliberate exclusion of British institutions and ideas. 
This took different forms, being dictated by 
local circumstances in the estimation of the 
colonialists. The particular form from place 
to place was dependent on the nature of 
the political institutions of the respective 
peoples.17
11.  Similar to many federal systems, there is an allocation of legislative powers between the two tiers of government in the Nigerian 
Constitution. There is the ‘Exclusive Legislative List’ which outlines the matters in under the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal (central) 
government and the ‘Concurrent Legislative List’ which sets out the matters over which the federal and state governments have shared 
legislative powers.
12.  Tekena Tamuno The Evolution of the Nigerian State (Longman London 1972) 33-35. Amnesty International ‘Rest in Pieces’. Available at: 
http://hrw.org/reports/2005/nigeria0705/1.htm
13. The Hausa (along with the Fulani) is the major ethnic group in Northern Nigeria.
14.  It was officially created by the merger in 1930 of the Lagos Police Force, the Southern Police Force and the Northern Police Force under 
Inspector-General Duncan.
15.  Etanibi O. Alemika & Innocent C. Chukwuma Analysis of Police and Policing in Nigeria: A Desk Study on the Role of Policing as a Barrier 
to Change or Driver of Change in Nigeria (CLEEN FOUNDATION Lagos Nigeria) 9-11.
16. Ibid.
17. E. A Afigbo The Warrant Chiefs- Indirect Rule in Southeastern Nigeria 1891-1929 (Longman London 1972) 2-5.
Colonialism played a critical 
role in police culture in Nigeria. 
Police forces were employed as 
agents of repression and violence 
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18. Ibid. 
19.  Toyin Falola and Mathew M. Heaton A History of Nigeria (Cambridge University Press Cambridge 2008) 110-112.
20.  Falola and Heaton note 19 at 110-111; Roger Blench, Selbut Longtau, Umar Hassan and Martin Walsh The Role of Traditional Rulers in 
Conflict Prevention and Mediation in Nigeria: Final Report (DFID 2006) 76 detailing six such instances in Northern Nigeria. Available at: 
http://www.rogerblench.info/Development/Nigeria/Conflict%20resolution/Final%20Report%20TRs% 20September%2006.pdf .
21.  A prominent example is the case of Oba Eshugbayi Eleko who resisted the authority of the Colonial Governor of Lagos and was 
deposed, arrested and removed from the colony. See Eshugbayi Eleko v The Officer Administrating the Government of Nigeria and 
Another [ 1931] UKPC 37; Eshugbayi Eleko v The Officer Administrating the Government of Nigeria and Another ([1928] 3 WWR 437, 
[1928] AC 459, [1928] UKPC 63.
22. Falola and Heaton note 19 at 119
23.  bid. at 118-124.
Broadly stated – as there were gradations18 – under indirect rule, the authority of traditional rulers 
(kings or chiefs) was officially recognised by the British. Such rulers were then allowed to maintain 
their power and govern their people through the various local systems and ideas to which the 
people were accustomed. In return for such recognition, the traditional rulers were themselves 
subjected to the authority and control of a colonial administrator.19
The imposition of indirect rule was however not always a smooth process. Notwithstanding 
the military might of the colonial authorities, there were several instances of resistance to the 
subjugation of the traditional rulers in the process of indirect rule.20 Indeed, the rulers of notable 
empires and kingdoms, including the rulers of Oyo, Sokoto, Benin, Ijaw, Itsekiri, Opobo, and 
Lagos, resisted colonial imposition. Most of the resistance from these rulers was derailed with 
military force and a considerable amount of violence. Many of these rulers were deposed and 
banished through the imposed colonial justice system.21
The colonial economy was centred on the export of cash crops. Such crops notably included: 
cocoa, cotton, palm produce, and groundnuts. There was also export of various minerals, most 
prominently tin, but “to a lesser degree, gold, silver, lead and diamonds.”22 The production of 
cash-crops was dominated by small-scale farmers. The whole structure of the trade largely 
benefitted British traders. There was, in turn, the importation of cheap textiles and sundry items, 
like matches, tobacco, electronic goods and medicines from Britain as well as the rest of Europe. 
The colonialists developed transportation infrastructure to facilitate the movement of these goods 
from the hinterland to the coastal areas. However, there was little substantial investment in the 
long-term development of the country.23
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Authoritarian Rule and Civi l  War 1966-1999
Despite being one of the first countries to gain independence in West Africa, Nigeria has had an 
irregular history of democratic governance. The elected government at independence was cut 
short on 15 January 1966 by a military rebellion master-minded by army officers, mainly from 
the Eastern part of the country. The rebellion led 
to the death of some national leaders including 
the Prime Minister and others, mainly from the 
northern, but also the south-western part of 
the country. The military coup was followed by 
another one six months later. This time, it was 
led by army officers from the northern part of 
the country. After the second military coup, a 
secession bid by the eastern part of the country led to a thirty-month civil war from 1967 to 1970, 
and nearly thirty years of military dictatorship under seven military regimes between January 
1966 and May 1999.24 The secession bid was violently put down and millions of lives, as well 
as properties, were lost. The infrastructure of vast areas of the eastern part of the country was 
destroyed.
At the end of the civil war, the federal government declared that there was no ‘victor, no 
vanquished’; that no side won or lost. In his ‘victory’ speech, military Head of State, General Yakubu 
Gowon, announced plans for rehabilitating, civil and public servants, and the self-employed.25 
The programme for ‘rehabilitation, reconstruction and reconciliation’ (3Rs) in the country26 was 
embedded in the country’s Second National Development Plan (2 nd NDP).27 However, the 3Rs 
had very limited implementation at best and many victims were not compensated or rehabilitated 
at the time or at all.
Law and Justice
The military, as mentioned above, came to power shortly after the end of colonial rule in Nigeria. 
Military regimes in the country handed down ‘enabling constitutional’ legislation, in which the 
POGG clause prominently featured.28 The colonial roots of the POGG power, set the stage for 
its subsequent adoption of the abuse of political power by successive military regimes. The first 
military legislation, Decree No.1 of 1966, illegally abolished the Parliament.29 Section 3 of the 
Decree provided that the Federal Military Government “shall have power to make laws for the 
peace, order and good government of Nigeria, or any part on any matter whatsoever.”30 The 
purport of all such laws was either to prohibit or limit the power of the courts to question the actions 
and legislation made by the military regime. Some of these laws violated national, regional and 
international human rights provisions and standards. Such laws were sometimes retroactive while 
others prohibited appeals from military tribunals to higher or regular courts. The tendency of the 
24. There was four years of civil democratic rule between 1 October 1979 and 31 December 1983.
25.  ‘The Dawn of National Reconciliation’ - Gowon’s Victory Message to the Nation, 15 January 1970 available at: https://maxsiollun.
wordpress.com/great-speeches-in-nigerias-history/ (accessed 05 December 2016).
26. Olukunle Ojeleye The Politics of Post-War Demobilisation and Reintegration in Nigeria (Ashgate Farnham 2010) xiii.
27. Ibid. at 2.
28. Isawa Elaigwu ‘Federalism under Civilian and Military Regimes’ ( 1988) 18 (1) Publius 173, 183
29. The military named federal and state legislation Decree and Edict respectively.
30. See also section 2 (1) of the Constitution (Suspension and Modification) Decree No.1 of 1983.
At the end of the civil war, the 
federal government declared 
that there was no ‘victor, no 
vanquished’; that no side won  
or lost.
III  POST-COLONIAL NIGERIA:  
AUTHORITARIANISM AND  
POLITICAL TRANSITION
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31.  Foreword by the Chairman, Synoptic Overview Oputa Panel Report: Summary, Conclusions and Recommendations (2004) available at: 
http://www.nigerianmuse.com/nigeriawatch/oputa/. The site also has the full report.
32.  For a more detailed account of the judicial murder of the Ken Saro-Wiwa and some members of the Movement for the Survival of 
the Ogoni People (MOSOP) see A Maja-Pearce From Khaki to Agbada: A Handbook for the February 1999 Elections in Nigeria (Civil 
Liberties Organisation Lagos 1999) 12-17.
33.  P C Aka ‘Nigeria since May 1999: Understanding the Paradox of Civil Rule and Human Rights Violations in Nigeria under President 
Olusegun Obasanjo’ (2003) 4 San Diego International Law Journal 209, 223.
34. Synoptic Overview note 31, 48-49.
35. Oputa Panel Report Vol.3 Chapter 7, 183, emphasis mine.
military to legislate for the country under the POGG power also promoted a permanent state of 
emergency in the country for almost thirty years.
Successive military regimes perfected plunder, compromised all institutions of state and generally 
directed them towards flagrant violations of human rights of the people.31 The population suffered 
repression, state-sponsored murder, restrictions on civil liberties and other forms of human rights 
violations. There was widespread use of lethal force by security agents and the police against 
the civilian populace. Between 1966 and 1993, over two hundred military officers and civilians 
were brought before military tribunals on charges related to at least seven instances of actual or 
alleged coup plots and were convicted and sentenced to death. While the military did sometimes 
direct its guns at its own, it was mainly the civilian population that was at the receiving end of 
military repression. For example, in the 1990s, protests against unpopular economic policies 
were met with the shooting and killing of hundreds of demonstrators.
Special Military Tribunals (SMTs) were established to try a number of civil offences, including 
armed robbery, drug trafficking, corruption in public office and ‘economic sabotage.’ SMTs 
were almost invariably chaired by serving senior military officers, and composed mainly 
of members of the military and security agencies, as well as a few civilians. They commonly 
imposed the death penalty and the convicted 
were, in some instances, summarily executed 
in breach of their constitutional right of appeal. 
Others were sentenced to long terms of 
imprisonment. Cases of public execution, in 
defiance of due process, included that of Ogoni 
rights activist and renowned author, Kenule 
Saro-Wiwa, and some other members of the 
Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People 
(MOSOP), referred to as the ‘Ogoni nine.’32 The 
administration of General Abacha (November 
1993 – June 1998) gained notoriety for been the 
cruellest.33
Various human rights violations were perpetrated 
by the army, the security agencies and the police.34 Arbitrary and long periods of detention were 
rampant. Gross human rights violations were common in the prisons. The Nigerian Prison Service 
itself described thus:
“…under the conditions of chronic prison congestion, perennial neglect of the 
services and delay in justice delivery, certain basic rights of prisoners are violated. 
The right to life and integrity of the person, to health and respect for human dignity 
are largely un-guaranteed.” 35
Successive military regimes 
perfected plunder, compromised 
all institutions of state, and 
generally directed them towards 
flagrant violations of human 
rights of the people. The 
population suffered repression, 
state-sponsored murder, 
restrictions on civil liberties, 
and other forms of human rights 
violations.
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36. Ibid. at 185
37. Oputa Panel Report, note 35 at 190.
38. Ibid. at 192-194.
39. Ibid. at 194-195.
40. Oputa Panel Report, note 35 at 214-219.
41. Ibid. at 220-223.
42. Ibid at 223.
43. Oputa Panel Report, note 35 at 227-228.
44. Oputa Panel Report, Volume 2 Chapter 5, 193.
45. Oputa Panel Report, note 35 Chapter 1, 11-27 and Chapter 4, 115-120
46. Ibid. at 26-27.
47. G N K Vukor-Quarshie ‘Criminal Justice Administration in Nigeria: Saro-Wiwa in Review’ (1997) 8 Criminal Law Forum 87, 104.
48.  Tunde I Ogowewo ‘Why the Judicial Annulment of the Constitution of 1999 is Imperative to the Survival of Nigeria’s Democracy’ (2000) 
44 Journal of African Law 135, 141
As an institution, the Nigeria Prisons Service, like many other civil institutions of the Nigerian 
society, suffered serious neglect during the period of military rule. New prisons were not built for 
decades. This was at a time when there was a phenomenal increase in the number of inmates, 
especially suspects awaiting trial. Prison authorities lacked medical facilities and were required 
to seek leave of the military authorities before obtaining medical attention for inmates. On many 
occasions, inmates died before such clearances were obtained.36 Detained persons lacked 
practically every necessity required for day-to-day living.37 In addition, juveniles were lumped with 
adult detainees and suffered similar deprivations.38 The special needs of female detainees were 
not met. Their reproductive rights were violated 
in addition to the violations suffered by their male 
counterparts. Some female inmates had babies 
in custody. Some were sexually assaulted. There 
were reports of female prisoners who were raped 
or had to provide sexual gratification to prison 
officials in exchange for essentials.39
The police force as an institution was neglected 
by successive military regimes. In frustration, 
the police took vengeance against the civil 
populace.40 Violations of rights by the police 
included illegal arrests, detention without trial41 and various forms of torture in the course 
of investigations to elicit ‘confessions.’42 Extra-judicial killings of suspects in custody, hapless 
motorists, passengers and pedestrians on the roads by the police were also common.43 The 
police were in the habit of killing people unlawfully and in the bid to cover up, they usually alleged 
such victims were armed robbers.44
There were also economic-related cases of gross violations of human rights. Cases of compulsory 
acquisition of land from individuals and communities by the state and ‘powerful’ individuals, without 
consultation or compensation were also common. There were some instances of corporate or 
individual violations of rights too. Arbitrary dismissal and retirement of workers by government 
without appropriate compensation, discrimination against ‘non-indigenes’, and extortion of peasant 
farmers by traditional rulers were also frequent in some parts of the country.45 In some cases, 
unpopular economic policies, like the Bretton Woods institutions imposed structural adjustment 
programmes precipitated the deprivation of the right to life. This was manifested in the shooting 
and killing of demonstrators at public protests – a common incidence in the 1990s.46
Polit ical  Economy
Military incursions into power were proclaimed to be in pursuit of economic rectitude, unity, and 
peace of the country.47 Arguably, none of these was achieved by the numerous military regimes.48 
Rather, the military institutionalised corruption, which has remained a formidable challenge to 
development and good governance in the country.
The special needs of female 
detainees were not met. custody. 
Some were sexually assaulted. 
There were reports of female 
prisoners who were raped or had 
to provide sexual gratification to 
prisons officials in exchange for 
essentials.
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49. ‘Worldwide Look at Reserves and Production’ Oil & Gas Journal (January 1, 2015).
50. African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights’ Comm. No. 155/96 (2001).
51.  For a discussion of this communication and the issue of economic, social and cultural rights in the area, see Hakeem O. Yusuf “Oil on 
Authoritarian Waters-Multinational Corporations and Realising Human Rights in the Developing World: A Nigerian Case Study” African 
Human Rights Law Journal (2008) 8 (1) 79.
52. Oputa Panel Report, note 35 at 32-33, see page 55-59 for few examples.
53. Oputa Panel Report, note 35 Chapter 5, 124-126.
54.  The State v. Lt.General Ishaya Baimayi & 4Ors (ID78/C/99), Criminal Division High Court of Lagos State. The accused on trial were 
a former chief of army staff, an ex-state military administrator, a retired state commissioner of police, chief security officer to General 
Abacha and the head of the late dictator’s mobile police team. In a separate trial following severance of the charge, the former Chief 
of Army Staff was recently acquitted. K Ketefe “Court Sets Bamaiyi Free after Nine Years in Detention” The Punch on the Web (Lagos 
Friday 4 April 2008).
On the economic front, the country’s dependence on oil was problematic for sustainable economic 
development. The country’s 37.9 billion barrels of proven reserves places it at the vantage position 
of being the largest producer of oil in Africa, and tenth largest in the world.49 With the experience 
of soaring oil prices in the late 1960s and early 1970s, successive military regimes quickly shifted 
emphasis from agriculture to crude oil exploitation. The government replaced agriculture as the 
leading foreign exchange earner; a situation that has persisted since then. Crude oil has come to 
account for over 90% of the country’s total exports.
Most of the oil reserves are located within the country’s Niger Delta area, in the south, but most 
of the area lacks basic infrastructure. Oil exploration activities in the Niger Delta added another 
dimension to the experience of human rights violations in the country namely, environmental 
rights. A classic example is the environmental degradation of Ogoniland and violation of group 
rights in the oil producing community. Successive military regimes militarised the area in order to 
contain expressions of social discontent. Ethnic and regional militia sprung up and have remained 
in this area especially, and the country as a whole. The ethnic militias mainly demand more 
autonomy of their respective areas, in the virtually military unitarised federal polity.
The situation in Ogoniland attracted international attention and was the subject of a communication 
to the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights entitled The Social and Economic 
Rights Action Centre for Economic and Social Rights v Nigeria.50 The applicants alleged that 
the oil exploration activities of Shell caused 
environmental degradation and health 
problems, resulting from the contamination of 
the environment among the Ogoni people.51 The 
ecological devastation and degradation resulted 
from the neglect of international standards in oil 
exploration activities.52 The African Commission 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights ruled in favour 
of the applicants. The Nigerian government 
recently initiated a clean-up of Ogoniland.
Extra-judicial killings and alleged state-
sponsored, politically-motivated assassinations 
were markedly common in some parts of the country. Politically-motivated murder was directed 
at various leading political figures.53 This was particularly rife between 1984 and 1999. Virtually 
all such cases remain unresolved to date. In some cases, perpetrators have not been identified. 
In others, they have not been prosecuted despite identification. There are also cases where the 
prosecutions have been stalled. Notable in this last category is the trial of some very high-ranking 
military officers for murder and attempted murder of some leading political figures in the zone.54 
The press was also a victim, as freedom of expression came under severe attack during the long 
years of military rule. The violations in this regard ranged from arrests and detention of journalists, 
arraignment for serious but unfounded offences, arson attacks on media houses to proscription 
of publications. 
The situation in Ogoniland 
attracted international attention 
and was the subject of a
communication to the African 
Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights entitled The
Social and Economic Rights 
Action Centre for Economic and 
Social Rights v Nigeria.
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The military eventually handed over power to 
an elected government on 29 May 1999, with 
the promulgation of a hurriedly produced and 
imposed constitution. By the time it left office, the 
military establishment had instituted a vicious 
cycle of violence which found expression in 
domestic violence, armed robbery, brigandage, 
religious riots, impunity, and lawlessness in the polity. The transition to civil rule followed a period 
of strong and sometimes violent agitation, but the eventual transition programme was accidental 
at best, and completely unnegotiated between the civil populace and the military rulers.
The transition to civil rule followed a period of strong and sometimes violent agitation, but the 
eventual transition programme was accidental, at best, and completely unnegotiated, between 
the civil populace and the military rulers. There was the recognition across the polity for a need to 
implement transitional justice measures.
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Political transition in Nigeria was largely brought about by the sudden death of the country’s 
military leader, General Sanni Abacha (in 1998), who was succeeded by General Abdusalami 
Abubakar. The latter was unequivocal in his resolve to deliver a prompt transition to civil democratic 
governance in the country. This context accounts, at least in part, for the subsequent uncoordinated 
approach to transitional justice in the country. One important consequence has been how it limited 
the opportunities for civil society to set an agenda for the transition, including, for instance, an 
engagement with the impact of colonial rule. Nonetheless, there was the recognition across the 
polity for a need to implement transitional justice measures, after the country transited to civil rule
on 29 May 1999.
Transit ional Justice
Trials and Lustration
The first steps toward transitional justice were taken by the last military regime led by General 
Abubakar, who commenced the prosecution of a handful of notorious military and security 
operatives of the penultimate military regime. About fifteen notorious members of the Abacha 
regime alleged to be have played prominent roles in state-sponsored killings and violence, were 
arraigned for various serious offences ranging from murder and kidnapping to arson. Some of 
those arrested and charged included his son Mohammed, a former chief of army staff, chief 
security officer of the former head of state, his 
chief police detail, his former chief security 
adviser, and a former military administrator of 
one of the states in the country. While some of 
the trials became moribund due to the absence 
of political will to proceed, many others have 
(except in two instances) not been concluded.
The delay in the trial process of cases forming part 
of the transitional justice measures, is due largely 
to the exploitation of a very weak criminal justice 
procedure, which remains largely unreformed 
since the colonial era. The colonial government had made ‘received English law’ a source of law in 
the Nigerian legal system. Received English law comprises of English common law, equity, statutes 
of general application in force in England on 1 January 1900 statutes and subsidiary legislation 
on specified matters and English law consisting of statutes (that is Acts of the United Kingdom 
Parliament and prerogative Orders in Council), which were introduced into Nigeria by English 
legislation, before 1 October 1960 and not yet repealed by an appropriate authority in Nigeria. 
In England, over the years, some common law principles have been amended or superseded 
by legislation. Also, some of the laws referred to as ‘statutes of general application’, have been 
amended or repealed in view of the various developments in the nature of crimes, technological 
advancements and realities of the times. However, this has not been the case in Nigeria.
IV  DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION  
AND CHALLENGES TO  
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE
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The continuing application 
of these antiquated common 
law principles in Nigeria, without 
substantive amendments, despite 
contemporary realities, has a 
negative impact on the effective 
and speedy trial of criminal 
cases.
55. The author was part of the prosecution team in these cases from 2000-2006.
56.  Ikechukwu Inochiri ‘Laws Regulating Criminal Trials in Nigeria Archaic – CJN’ Vanguard Newspaper (23 March 2015) available at: 
http://www.vanguardngr.com/2015/03/laws-regulating-criminal-trials-in-nigeria-archaic-cjn/ (accessed 14 March 2017).
57.  H Kwasi Prempeh ‘Marbury in Africa: Judicial Review and the Challenge of Constitutionalism in Contemporary Africa’ (2006) 80 Tulane 
Law Review 1239, 1301.
58. The Abubakar regime spent less than a year in office (from 9 June 1998- 29May 1999).
The continuing application of these antiquated common law principles in Nigeria, without 
substantive amendments, despite contemporary realities, has a negative impact on the effective 
and speedy trial of criminal cases.
Defence counsels, especially experienced senior lawyers, often exploit the state of the law. 
Many objections to the trials of former members of the Abacha regime have been raised, in 
response to the notorious practice of prolonging the trial processes. This involved appealing 
virtually every interlocutory issue or objection, all the way to the Supreme Court, while insisting 
on a stay of the trial, while awaiting the appeal decision. Once the issue on appeal is decided, 
new applications are made, and a vicious cycle of long-standing trials is maintained. In one 
instance, after frustrating the continuation of his 
trial for more than seven years through such a 
process, the accused brought an application to 
challenge the delay (he) occasioned in the trial 
as an injustice.55
In canvassing the passage of the Criminal 
Justice Act in 2015, then Chief Justice of 
Nigeria, Justice Mahmud Mohammed had 
lamented that laws regulating the criminal justice 
system were obsolete. “We face prolonged 
delays in the trial of criminal cases leading to 
an increase in detainees awaiting trial and the congestion of the prisons. I believe we are well 
aware of these and other problems. The situation is made more precarious due to the archaic 
and obsolete nature of the laws regulating the criminal justice system.”56 An important step in 
addressing the challenges was the recent passage of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act 
(ACJA) 2015. The ACJA is aimed at promoting the “efficient management of criminal justice 
institutions, speedy dispensation of justice, protection of the society from crimes and protection 
of the rights and interests of the suspect, the defendant and victims in Nigeria”. However, due 
both to its recent passage and the slow pace of adaptation to its provisions by the judiciary 
and criminal justice agencies, it is yet to make a significant impact on the criminal justice 
administration in the country.
The foregoing state of affairs in the judiciary calls further attention to the institutional heritage 
of the judiciary from its colonial founding. To the average citizen, the judiciary, to a large extent, 
constitutes one of the most prominent symbols of a colonial heritage. It is usually considered as 
being somewhat removed from the regular day-to-day activities of the common folk. Even in the 
post-authoritarian period in Nigeria, the courts continue to suffer from a serious ‘social legitimacy’ 
deficit, enjoying limited recognition from society57 – certainly much less than the two political 
branches of government. The public trust in the judiciary as an institution for securing rights and 
abating impunity is understandably low.
In any event, the initial move to try, even the few individuals, for violations of human rights, was 
half-hearted at best. The move was perhaps conditioned by the reality of the precarious balance 
of power in the short life of that ‘transitional regime’ itself.58 General Abubakar was acutely aware 
of the high-level of domestic and international opposition to continued military rule in the country. 
From a pragmatic point of view, the fact was also not lost on him, that the minions of his predecessor 
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remained in the corridors of power and could 
attempt to oust him from power through a coup, 
if the opportunity presented itself.
Further more, an important feature of the 
Abubakar regime was the symbolic lustration 
of about two hundred ‘political’ military officers 
from active service. These officers had held 
political appointments as governors or administrators of the various states, cabinet ministers and 
chairmen of important state agencies, public corporations and similar government institutions. 
Many of them had been corrupt and accumulated fabulous wealth well beyond their legitimate 
earnings. The experience had made holding political office, rather than military service for which 
they were engaged, very attractive and an incentive for coup-plotting.
The circumstances of the judiciary, trials and limited application of lustration highlighted above in 
the process of political transition from authoritarian rule, raise wider issues of institutional legacies 
from the colonial experience. There are issues that could be considered in this regard across the 
spectrum of government institutions like the civil service, the security agencies; the military and 
intelligence services, the police and so on, at the point of independence. There was generally no 
recourse to what would today, be regarded as transitional justice measures or processes. There 
were no trials for human rights violations just as there was no record of the use of lustration at the 
time. There are number of possible explanations for this. For one thing, transitional justice had 
not assumed the prominence it now has at that period in world history, despite the Nuremberg 
precedent. Another possible explanation could be that the absence of an armed struggle for 
independence in Nigeria made the imperative of transitional justice measures less pressing, even 
if arguably relevant. There are other angles that could plausibly be explored and unpacked on 
the issue but are outside the scope of the present paper due, in part at least, to size constraints.
The Truth-Telling Process
The truth-telling process is the most important transitional justice mechanism adopted in the 
post-authoritarian/military era in Nigeria. Barely three weeks after its inauguration in 1999, the 
newly elected administration of President Olusegun Obasanjo took their cue from the various 
truth processes in Latin America and South Africa, by establishing the Human Rights Violations 
Investigation Commission.59 The Commission came to be popularly known as the ‘Oputa 
Panel.’60 However, the Oputa Panel’s remit did not include consideration of the colonial period. 
In fact, it was initially empowered to examine only violations of human rights committed during 
the period from 1 October 1979 when the incumbent president had handed over to a democratic 
government, to 1999 when he re-emerged as an elected President. The Oputa Panel was later 
granted an extended remit that covered the whole of the period of military rule. It is also relevant 
to note that the Oputa Panel had rather shaky 
legal foundations, as the Tribunals of Inquiry Act 
under which it was established was a colonial 
legacy principally designed for specialised 
inquiries. It fell well short of the more extensive 
remit of a truth commission, in a post-military 
transitional society like Nigeria, at the end of the 
20th century.
The absence of an armed struggle 
for independence in Nigeria made 
the imperative of transitional 
justice measures less pressing, 
even if arguably relevant.
The truth-telling process is  
the most important transitional 
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the post-authoritarian/military  
era in Nigeria.
59.  By Statutory Instrument No.8 of 1999 (as amended by Statutory Instrument No.13 of 1999) pursuant to Tribunals of Inquiry Act (TIA) No. 
447, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 1990.
60.  So named after the chairman. For an exposition on the work of the Oputa Panel See Hakeem O. Yusuf ‘Travails of Truth: Achieving 
Justice for Victims of Impunity in Nigeria’ (2007) 1 (2) International Journal of Transitional Justice 268.
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There is a continuing disconnect between the police and the society. The Oputa Panel found that 
there is an historical perspective to human rights violations by the Nigerian Police. In furtherance 
of the colonial divide and rule strategy, the recruitment policy was to employ individuals to police 
ethnic groups whose language the police officers did not understand, and who were in fact, 
historically hostile to the latter’s places of origin. The inherited recruitment strategy effectively 
secured the loyalty of the police as an occupational force rather than one for social service. 
At independence, the national government found it expedient to maintain the status quo. This 
impacted negatively on police-public relations, with the police continuing to act as an imperial 
force. A careful audit of the petitions on violations of human rights by the police, notably on 
extra-judicial killings, revealed that most policemen alleged to have been involved were indeed 
from ethnic groups different from those of victims. The experience of the people with the military 
is the same as with the police and sometimes worse in a number of ways. Like the police, the 
military forces were established by the British colonial government and the initial elements of what 
became the Nigerian army were formerly part of the police.
The Oputa Panel submitted its report in June 2003 but the report remains officially unpublished 
and unimplemented as a formal project. The government that set up the Oputa Panel refused to 
publish the report. The refusal to publish the report was premised on a Supreme Court decision 
that the 1999 Constitution did not make provisions for such a commission of inquiry, and that 
the law that the Oputa Panel was created under, was no longer applicable. The case in point 
is Justice Chukwudifu Oputa (Rtd.) and Human 
Rights Violations Investigation Commission and 
Gani Fawehinmi, v General Ibrahim Babangida, 
Brigadier Halilu Akilu and Brigadier Kunle 
Togun.61 The crux of the case was a challenge 
brought against the powers of the Oputa Panel to 
summon witnesses. The case was instituted by 
a former military Head of State, General Ibrahim 
Babangida (1985-1993), and two of his military 
security chiefs. They had been summoned 
to testify in a petition alleging conspiracy 
and murder by letter bomb of a prominent 
investigative journalist in the country, Dele Giwa. 
The life and professional career of Dele Giwa was cut short in 1986 by a letter-bomb, allegedly 
delivered by military intelligence on the orders of then military ruler General Ibrahim Babangida. 
Giwa was noted for his seminal and credible reporting of sensitive matters of public interest in 
the 80’s. Investigation into his murder was abandoned by the police and closed prematurely. His 
solicitor brought a petition to the Oputa Panel as part of efforts to secure justice in the matter. The 
former head of state and his intelligence chiefs refused to appear to the summons of the Oputa 
Panel and challenged it in court. Eventually, the Supreme Court held that President Obasanjo 
lacked the powers to set up a body like the Oputa Panel, with a remit that extended to the whole 
country to enquire into human rights violations. Further, it held that the powers of the Panel to 
summon the Plaintiffs were a violation of their right to liberty. At that point, the Oputa Panel had 
concluded and submitted its work.
In dumping the Oputa Panel’s Report, with its wide-ranging and far-reaching recommendations 
for accountability and institutional reforms, the Nigerian state set the stage for real and potential 
61. [2003] M.J.S.C 63. See Hakeem O. Yusuf ‘The Judiciary and Constitutionalism in Transitions: A Critique’ (2007) 7 (3) Global Jurist 1
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conflicts and gross violations of human rights in the country, both by public and private actors. 
The country has, since 1999, witnessed several ethnic and inter-communal conflicts, resulting in 
the loss of hundreds of lives and millions of dollars in property. This has led to the view in certain 
quarters that not only has the transition to democracy failed to deliver on justice and restoration 
of the rule of law, but also that impunity and violence have remained unchecked, if not increased, 
in the country.
Colonial ism and Challenges to Transit ional Justice
The legacy of authoritarian rule connects closely with the colonial past. Both are marked by violence 
and exploitation. Both are major factors in the failed project of transitional justice in Nigeria. Even 
if only indirectly, the military establishment still wields considerable influence after the political 
transition. Consider in this regard, that Nigeria 
has had four presidents in the period of transition 
to civil democratic governance. Two have 
been former military Heads of State, Olusegun 
Obasanjo (1999-2007) and Muhammadu Buhari 
(2015- ). Obasanjo openly imposed the two 
others on the ruling party at the time; late Musa 
Yar’Adua (2007-2009) and Goodluck Jonathan 
(2009-2015). Thus, in the whole period of the 
political transition from military rule to date, the 
country has had either an erstwhile military ruler 
or his designated candidate as the elected executive president of Nigeria. It is important to bear in 
mind that Nigeria is a federal state, modelled after the United States’ presidential system. A critical 
issue for any attempt at social transformation is the fact that the Nigerian President enjoys wider 
constitutional powers than the American President. This is a product also of military rule which 
imposed a lopsided federation on the country due to years of accumulated power at the centre for 
the military head of state. The lopsided nature 
of the current federal arrangement remains an 
issue in Nigeria’s political discourse, and which 
remains unaddressed, generating tension, 
from time to time among the political elite and 
different levels of government. This is the case 
because among others, the federal structure 
directly impacts fiscal arrangements, control, 
and distribution of national revenue, especially 
income from oil but also from taxes like value 
added tax. However, at best, the current structure 
has an indirect connection to the colonial legacy 
at best; it is a product of military rule.
The military have been gate-keepers of their legacy of political misrule. They remain keen to 
ensure only one of their numbers or designated candidates that can be trusted, hold the reins of 
political power where it matters most. This is to ensure that those responsible for impunity in the 
past are not brought to account. That aim has been generally achieved – especially at the federal 
level. In the first elections after military rule, former military rulers contested and won elections as 
Not only has the transition to 
democracy failed to deliver on 
justice and restoration of the rule 
of law, but also that impunity 
and violence have remained 
unchecked, if not increased,  
in the country.
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state governors and members of the federal parliament. Rich, retired senior military officers, who 
had held political office, played active, and usually leading roles in supporting and sponsoring 
candidates for elections. A former military governor and minister was Senate President for eight 
years and is still a member of the Senate.
Nepotism has also added to maintaining a status quo of unaccountability for gross violations of 
human rights. A former Chief of Naval Staff became a State Governor. Recently, his son was 
elected into the federal Senate. Some military apologists, contractors, business acolytes or 
relations of former military officers who had held public office, contested and won elections. This 
was an important feature of the first decade of the post-authoritarian political transition. The son-
in-law of a former military head of state is currently a governor of their state, in the northern part 
of the country. Another ex-Head of State’s son-in-law was governor in a state in the north for eight 
years. Even the judiciary is not immune from the influence of the military. Quite apart from the fact 
that many judges appointed by the military across the hierarchy of the state and federal judiciary 
(including its highest levels) remain on the bench, some are family members and close relations 
of the former military rulers. For example, the wife of a former head of state only recently retired 
as a Chief Judge of a State, and a wife of the former Chief of Naval Staff mentioned earlier, is a 
judge of the federal high court.
Two, among a number of important disconcerting features of the legal and statutory framework 
of governance in Nigeria’s political transition, can be discerned in the Oputa Panel case. First, 
is the continued extensive reliance on autocratic legislation by all branches of government 
deriving from the colonial past and authoritarian military rule. It is relevant to observe that there 
is now consciousness on the undesirability of the situation but positive action to displace it has 
been marginal at best. Deriving from this, an elected transition government placed reliance on 
the Tribunals of Inquiry Act (TIA), a pre-republican legislation, to set up a truth commission by 
executive action rather than custom-made legislation. This was at a time when the latter approach 
had become standard practice elsewhere as 
was in Ghana and South Africa, for instance. This 
anomaly has continued with truth processes that 
have been initiated in the country (principally 
at the state level like that in Rivers and Osun 
states).
Second, is the conventional, uncritical judicial 
observance of precedents based on principles 
of the common law, imported into the country 
as part of the colonial legal system. This 
attitude explains the extensive reliance by the 
Supreme Court on the case of Sir Abubakar 
Tafawa Balewa & Others v Doherty & Others 
(Balewa v Doherty)62 in the Oputa Panel case. In 
Balewa v Doherty, the Federal Supreme Court 
as well as the Privy Council upheld objections 
to the powers and the jurisdictional scope of the 
Commissions of Enquiry Act, 1961 which had 
similar provisions to the TIA. The adoption of 
62. (1963) 1 WLR 949.
63.  Human Rights Watch Rest in Pieces (2005) Vol. 17, No. 11(A) https://www.hrw.org/reports/2005/nigeria0705/ (accessed 16 January 
2017)
64.  Parry Osayande ‘Creating Awareness on Concept and Principles of Civilian Oversight of Police’ in I Chukwuma (ed) Civilian Oversight 
and Accountability of Police in Nigeria (Centre for Law Enforcement Education Lagos 2003) chp.9, p.2.
65. Andrew Walker ‘What Is Boko Haram?’ (2012) United States Institute for Peace Special Report 308, 9-10.
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a plain-fact approach by the Court, to which it 
was no doubt accustomed, hit at the root of the 
transitional context and implicitly, at the least, 
undermined the rule of law.
The historical background of the police as a 
force established to protect British economic 
interest and political domination of the local 
communities, largely shaped its attitude and 
conduct to date.63 As noted by a former Deputy 
Inspector General of Police, Parry Osayande, “From the very first day the police was established, 
it became estranged and alienated from Nigerians.”64
Since 2009, Nigeria has been caught in the grip of serious acts of violence; bombings, killings and 
destruction of property linked to the Jama’atu Ahlus-Sunnah Lidda’Awati Wal Jihad, commonly 
known as Boko Haram (western education/civilisation is evil). The North East Nigeria-based 
Islamist insurgent group demands the establishment of an ‘Islamic State’, at least in the northern 
part of the country as well as the unconditional release of its detained members. Some accounts 
attribute the group’s violence to religious fanaticism or Islamic ‘revivalism’; typical of wider 
international narratives of terrorism.65 The official narrative between 2010 and 2015, was that the 
group was set up by forces opposed to the administration then in power. The government was 
lead by President Goodluck Jonathan, a Christian from the minority Ijaw ethnic group from the
southern part of the country. Significantly, however, relevant stakeholders, local voices at, close 
to, or otherwise connected to the epicentre of the violence, have maintained an alternative 
narrative. On this account, the violence is a product of social displacement and neglect, abject 
poverty and gross disenchantment with government and the state by some elements from that 
least developed part of the country. 
The handling of the Boko Haram insurgency provides insight into the dynamics of the handling 
of security matters in the country. In 2012, Bukar Abba Ibrahim, a Senator (and former Governor 
of Yobe State) representing parts of the epicentre of the Boko Haram insurgency, denounced 
security agencies for killing more people than the Boko Haram and making matters worse for 
the people, contrary to official claims. He noted that Boko Haram had existed for ‘ages’ as a 
peaceful group but the impunity of the security agencies, particularly the police, provoked it to 
violence against the state. He lamented that whenever a security agent was harmed in any way, 
the security forces respond by cordoning off such an area and burning down all property there. 
“What,” he wondered “has [burning] property got to do with people killing security agents on the 
road?”66
Beyond adroit lip-service, little by way of substantial institutional reform of policing has taken 
place in Nigeria in the post-colonial period. Policing arrangements are such that despite the large 
population running into an estimated 150 million people, there is only one police force in the 
country. It is under the control of the federal government. Calls for State control and community 
policing to enhance effectiveness and legitimacy of the police have remained largely ignored for 
decades. Concerned by this disconnect, President Obasanjo, when he came to power in 1999, 
attempted to change the negative culture by moving unsuccessfully for a name change from 
‘Nigeria Police Force’ to the ‘Nigeria Police.’67
The violence is a product of 
social displacement and neglect, 
abject poverty, and gross 
disenchantment with government 
and the state, by some elements 
from that least developed part  
of the country.
66.  Onyedi Ojiabor and Sanni Onogu ‘Buhari’s Stand on Boko Haram Rattles Presidency’ The Nation (9 November 2012) available at: 
 http://thenationonlineng.net/buharis-stand-on-boko-haram-rattles-presidency/ (accessed 16 February 2017).
67.  The move was challenged on the basis that the name was a constitutionally stipulated one and only a constitutional amendment 
change it.
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The implementation of transitional justice in the post-authoritarian/military era in Nigeria has been 
a failure. Even the symbolic trials commenced soon after the political transition have been largely 
moribund due to political and technical factors. The lustration measure that was implemented has, 
at best, produced a crop of very powerful 
ex-military officers. The group emerged as 
key political players in the transition to civil 
governance, with largely ill-gotten wealth 
secured from years of authoritarian rule. 
The lustration process was only directed at 
disengaging this crop of officers from active 
military service and nothing else. Since they were not barred from seeking elective office, they 
have emerged as a strong force on the political front. Benefitting from their deep-pockets, they have 
assumed key elective positions or sponsored candidates for elections to protect their interests.
Worse still, the major mechanism for obtaining accountability and justice for victims of impunity—
the truth-telling process—has been frustrated by a combination of dynamics. The most prominent 
of the dynamics is the deficiency of sincerity on the part of the initiating regime. As a process, 
the truth-telling mechanism did a commendable job of seeking to establish the truth about the 
course of executive and legislative governance in the authoritarian period. It assisted the bid to 
legitimise the post-authoritarian civilian administration, but the value of its well-received work 
remains questionable. The search for justice, truth and reconciliation through the Oputa Panel 
suffered a fundamental setback in its lack of tailor-made legislation. Such legislation would have 
made provisions for its functions as a truth commission for the whole country with the power to 
summon witnesses as required. Further, the law would have specified the duty of the government 
to cooperate with the truth commission and respect Nigeria’s obligations under international law. 
The instrumental use of the legal system and the holes therein, is a consequence and product 
of the colonial regime’s imposition of English Common Law on Nigeria and the post-colonial 
regimes’ failures to appropriate revise and 
update the legal frameworks. The Nigerian 
society continues to pay a heavy price for 
the failure of transitional justice. More than a 
decade and half after the military left power, 
a myriad of conflicts that have since ensued 
to challenge institutional reform, good 
governance and development in the country. 
The situation provides ample evidence of 
the danger inherent in neglecting to address 
the impunity that was the defining feature 
and legacy of the colonial and authoritarian 
period.
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